Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars by Craig, Jr., Hardin
SECRET WEAPONS OF THE 
NAPOLEONIC WARS 
T might not be amiss t o  ask: what is a secret weapon? Dur- 
ing the recent war we had all sorts of answers, usually in 
the form of Nazi threats. A transatlantic rocket would indeed 
have been a secret weapon, but we were sometimes told that 
Hitler's secret weapon was hunger, applied t o  enslaved peo- 
ples, and that ours was America's know-how in back-yard 
mechanics. But a secret weapon should be a t  least reason- 
ably secret, and something of a surprise to  the enemy when 
it is used, and it should be a weapon. 
For the period under discussion, I should like t o  begin with 
a few borderIine cases. I n  1795, an official regulation made 
lemon juice a regular part of the diet of his Majesty's sailors. 
It was about time, incidentally, since the virtues of the citrus 
fruits in combating scurvy had been known, to  some at  least, 
since the days of Elizabeth. Edward Jenner's smallpox vac- 
cination, first convincingly demonstrated in 1796, was soon 
put into the regulations as something constantly to  be rec- 
ommended by military surgeons, although no one was to  be 
vaccinated against his will. No doubt the British armed forces 
benefited from these measures, and earlier than the men of 
other countries, but no effort was made to  keep the discover- 
ies from becoming common property, and they can hardly be 
called secret weapons. 
Toward the end of the Napoleonic War a British naval 
architect designed a fighting ship with a rounded instead of a 
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square stern. The idea was a t  once taken up, since i t  made a 
stronger and more seaworthy ship and permitted the mount- 
ing of additional guns. This, however, comes under the head 
of minor improvements, of which there were many, and in all 
navies. 
I n  gunnery there were some changes, one especialIy which 
shows an interesting tendency and should be noticed. During 
the War of the American Revolution, a new gun, called the 
carronade because i t  was first manufactured in quantity a t  
the Carron Iron Works in Scotland, was adopted by the 
Royal Navy. It hardly came into its own until the Napoleon- 
ic Wars. Like the others, i t  was a muzzle-loading smooth- 
bore and was made in the standard calibres. It was, however, 
much lighter in weight and shorter in the barrel-say one 
ton against three, and four feet against ten, in comparison 
with one of the big fellows throwing a shot of the same size. 
This meant, of course, that the carronade was useless at 
long range and required a reduced charge of powder, but a t  
close quarters it was very effective. It was popular on small 
ships, where maximum firepower with minimum weight was 
wanted. During the war with Napoleon it  became increasing- 
ly customary to  substitute carronades of large calibre for the 
standard guns of small calibre which all ships, even the 
largest, necessarily carried on their upper decks. This simpli- 
fied the supply problem because fewer sizes of ammunition 
had to  be provided. 
It was Napoleon, in one of those flashes of naval intuition 
which he occasionally showed, who tried t o  carry this antici- 
pation of the all-big-gun principle t o  its logical conclusion. 
Early in 1805 he wrote to  his Minister of Marine: "I have 
several times spoken of my project of arming ships of the line 
with guns of the same calibre." Accordingly, only 36-pounder 
guns and 36-pounder carronades were t o  be retained. "In this 
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war," continued the artillerist-emperor, "the English have 
been the first t o  use carronades, and everywhere they have 
done us great harm." But the probIem was to  get the weap- 
ons, though they were no longer secret, and here Napoleon 
could not work a miracIe. He tried t o  expedite matters in 
order after order. For example: "For God's sake, ship me 
some carronades. . . . The English, without saying a word, 
have practised this method. Here's ten years we are behind 
their Admiralty. . . . I see no attention being paid to  it." Here 
was the all-big-gun principle, exploited by the British and 
envied by the French, an anticipation of some of the argu- 
ments used a hundred years later by Admirals Sims and 
Fisher. Not entirely the same, of course, for the modern 
Dreadnought and her progeny are armed not only on the 
alEbig-gun but also on the few-big-gun principle, and no one 
then proposed the use of a few monster guns only. But it was 
a great day for some people; as one old sea-dog, Admiral 
Howe, said, "Happy are those who have shares in the Carron 
Company." 
The examples which I have mentioned are not true secret 
weapons, but the inventors were busy. It must have been a 
difficult time for those in the top positions, for under the 
stimulus of war, bright-minded people bombarded them from 
arm-chairs and other points of vantage with strategical plans, 
gadgets, and all sorts of devices for achieving victory. I have 
seen the correspondence of the British Admiralty for only the 
year 1806, but there is no reason to  think that  i t  was dif- 
ferent in any other year, or that the French mind was less 
active. For example, a sampling of the mailbag for a period of 
a few months will show something like this: a shallow draft 
landing barge; a new type of block for the rigging; a project 
for dismembering the Spanish empire in South America; a 
new type of gun carriage; how to  beat a big ship, using only 
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small craft; a simplified code of flag signals and semaphore 
telegraph; a new cipher; a chemical solution for treating iron 
to  prevent rust; proposals for a new naval academy; a 
steamship, which could be loaded with explosives and direct- 
ed against the enemy without having anyone on board; a new 
type of frigate; a new method of finding longitude; and a 
project for filling ships with stone and sinking them in 
French harbors. The worried gentlemen at the Admiralty, 
not accustomed t o  dealing with such matters, had to  find 
what was useful in a11 this and filter out the nuts. How the 
job was done, in the case of a few famous inventions, should 
next occupy our attention; though to set the stage, i t  is nec- 
essary to  glance briefly a t  the international situation as i t  
existed in 1803, when, after a short and uneasy truce, Brit- 
ain and France renewed their struggle. 
By this time Napoleon knewvery well who his chief antago- 
nist was and that he would have to  deal with her directly. 
With a good telescope one could see the tents of the French 
troops camped on the opposite side of the Channel, waiting 
for their opportunity to  invade. Landing craft were built 
inland, then sent down the rivers and along the coast to  the 
assembly points, under the protection of many batteries. 
The word went out that I 50,000 men, a force larger than Brit- 
ain's regular army, could be embarked on these craft in two 
hours, to  be landed on the coast of England any dark night 
when the wind was favorable. 
On both sides of the Channel, peopIe who would nowadays 
make a good living from the comic books foretold wonders 
that were t o  supplement the usual means of making war. A 
tunnel was to  be dug under the Channel, t o  be driven through 
just when a French assault force in balloons drifted across t o  
secure a beach-head. Englishmen armed with pistols and held 
aloft by large kites were t o  contest the landing of this air- 
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borne force. Or, t o  outfight the British vessels, great rafts, 
with citadels mounting hundreds of guns, were to  bring the 
army across, their motive power supplied by windmills har- 
nessed to  paddle wheels. 
One may be sure that such schemes were far from Napo- 
leon's mind, but there can be no doubt that he seriously in- 
tended to  stage an invasion. Some question has, indeed, been 
raised as to  whether he really meant business; i t  has been 
shown, for instance, that  instead of I 50,000 men embarked in 
two hours, his utmost effort could have put 9o,ooo men afloat 
in eighteen, taking advantage of two high tides. His units 
were not a t  full strength and his harbors silted up; he himself 
said later, on thinking it over, that he really intended to  
crush the Austrians and the Russians and that  the great 
force necessary for this plan could best be assembled at  the 
Channel, so that  the intended victims would not be fore- 
warned. 
The invasion publicity contained two striking pieces of 
evidence which are not, in themselves, entirely conclusive: 
one is the medal, ostensibly struck at  London, which was 
made to  commemorate the invasion, and the other the great 
175-foot marble column, called the Colonne de la Grande 
Armei, which was raised near the coast a few miles from 
Boulogne. This shaft was topped by a statue of the Emperor, 
and I am reliably informed that he points across the sea to- 
ward England, above the inscription, "Veil; l'enemi!"- 
"There is the enemy!" At least he did stand thus, but in 
August, 1914, when the adjoining area was turned into a base 
camp for the British Expeditionary Force, the Curators of 
National Monuments had a twinge of embarrassment when 
they realized the unfriendliness of this gesture. With truly 
Gallic ingenuity and courtesy, and the help of a couple of 
steeplejacks, they faced the Little Corporal t o  the right, 
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where he pointed now to  the advancing Germans-"Voil; 
l'enemi!" I dare say Hitler had him turned back again. This 
story certainly ought to  be true, and the column certainly 
was built. 
If Napoleon's campaign was a feint, it was a good one, and 
no government in its senses could afford t o  ignore the threat. 
The British army and militia were increased, and to  these 
were added, in a year's time, a home guard of 3 50,ooo volun- 
teers. Strong points called Martello towers were built a11 
along the threatened coast; the idea and the name seem to  
have come from a place called Mortella in Corsica, where 
there was a tower which had given Hood and Nelson a lot of 
trouble in their operations against the island in 1794. Work 
was also pushed on a big ditch, called the Hythe Military 
Canal. There were not lacking those who ridiculed the ditch 
which was supposed to  stop the French after they had al- 
ready crossed a much bigger one, but i t  was, of course, in- 
tended to  plug a vulnerable gap and slow up the invaders 
long enough for the home guard t o  rally, just as the towers 
were supposed to  impede progress from the beach. Part of 
the home guard, living in the ports, called themselves the Sea 
Fencibles and were to  man various small gunboats in case of 
attack. While always professing themselves ready to  spring 
into the breach, they never allowed the call of duty to  inter- 
fere with their private pursuits. The Royal Navy perforce 
had to  allow them to exist, but never placed tuppence worth 
of reliance upon them. 
The Navy felt that  i t  had the situation well in hand. It re- 
sisted the usual outcry t o  have a battleship anchored off each 
port and beach, and set up its defenses with a few ships of 
force, called block ships, assigned to  certain in-shore stations. 
The Channel was patrolled by squadrons of sloops and frig- 
ates, entirely adequate t o  cope with French invasion barges. 
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The real defence, as well as the real danger, came from the 
big ships, which seldom saw the shores of England. Napole- 
on's plan evolved into one of decoying away the British ships 
of the line blockading his harbors, and then getting into the 
Channel with a real battle fleet for long enough to  cover the 
crossing. It was this elaborately worked-out plan, which was 
actually attempted, which I think proves that Napoleon was 
deadly serious about the invasion. Hard work and alertness 
frustrated the plan, and the shores of England were defended 
far from home by those "distant, storm-beaten ships, upon 
which the Grand Army fof Napoleon] never looked" t o  use 
Admiral Mahan's fine phrase. 
But you never could tell, and the minds of many turned to  
novel ways of outwitting the enemy. Opportunity had 
knocked first for the French in the person of Robert Fulton, 
one of those international Americans of the period who was, 
like Samuel F. B. Morse, a painter turned inventor. I n  1800, 
mostly on his own, Fulton produced in France a submarine 
which could dive, and, with the aid of a two-man power 
motor, proceed under water, It was literally two-man power, 
since two intrepid volunteers turned a crank which drove the 
propeller. Armed with an official letter, stating that he was 
acting under government orders and was not, if captured, to  
be treated as a pirate-on pain of reprisals-he started out 
one day to  show them and gallantly but harmlessly pursued a 
couple of English brigs which had ventured close t o  shore. 
The idea was to attach mines t o  the bottoms of the enemy's 
ships, but his little boat never had a chance. 
FuIton aIso built a steamboat, in 1803, which moved up- 
stream in the Seine "at the pace of a rapid pedestrian," It 
sank one night a t  its dock, and the incident quite unjustly 
caused a loss of public confidence. It should be emphasized 
that  the steamboat in itself was ~otent ia l ly  a revolutionary 
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weapon of war, because i t  could move in a calm which would 
then stop even the biggest warship. Fulton was the first t o  
perceive its possibilities in warfare, though hewas not in this 
case, nor in that  of thesubmarine, the first inventor in thefield. 
Napoleon's attitude toward FuIton's offerings is obscure. 
Following the first submarine experiments, Fulton submitted 
a plan for crossing the channel in a submarine and laying 
mines in English harbors. The  First Consul wanted to  see 
the submarine and was informed that  it had been scrapped; a 
new and better one would be forthcoming, however, in re- 
turn for a satisfactory financial arrangement; Napoleon's 
comment was that Fulton was a charlatan and a swindler 
who wished solely t o  make money. Fulton was not impris- 
oned and tortured, showing that Napoleon had much to  learn 
in order t o  become a full-fledged dictator. 
Napoleon was equally skeptical two years later, in 1803, on 
being offered a prospectus for a steamboat t o  tow troop 
barges t o  England. Napoleon always showed an aversion to  
long-hairs, whom he called ideologues, and apparently to  in- 
ventors as well. "Bah!" he said, "these projectors are all 
either intriguers or visionaries. Don't trouble me about the 
busine~s.'~ But a year later, in July 1804, faced with the prac- 
tical difficulties of his undertaking, the reaction was quite 
different. By some chance Fulton's steamboat scheme was 
resubmitted t o  Napoleon, who immediately wrote t o  the 
head of his Marine Department: "I have just read the proj- 
ect of Citizen Fulton, which you have sent me much too 
late, since i t  is one that may change the face of the world. 
. . . I desire that you immediately confide its examination to a 
Commission. . . . A great truth, a physical, palpable truth is 
before my eyes. It will be for these gentlemen to  t ry  and seize 
it and see it. . . . Try  to  let the whole be concluded within 8 
days, as I am impatient." 
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But Citizen Fulton was not to be found; under the name of 
Mr. Francis, he had reached London two months before. This 
change of sides, for which no blame can be attached to  FuIton, 
had been engineered by Fulton's friend the Earl of Stanhope. 
The Earl was an inventor, too; he had designed a steamboat 
that did not run, and a printing press that did; he took his 
friend seriously enough so that: he produced a mine-sweeping 
device to take up Fulton's mines. 
Fulton's proposals, for which he soon received substantial 
government backing, went much further than the manufac- 
ture of isolated novelties. He had a Submarine System (with 
capital letters), a plan for organizing special squadrons and 
taking the offensive in a new way. This appealed to  William 
Pitt, who was unquestionably seeking means ofchangingover 
from the purely defensive; it wouId be a mistake to think of 
Britain's leaders at  this time as merely wondering what the 
French would do next. 
Fulton's system comprised explosive infernal machines and 
the means of taking them to  their targets. An improved sub- 
marine would be best, he thought, but when this failed of ap- 
proval he was willing to  compromise on ordinary surface 
craft. The weapons were what we should call mines, but which 
were then referred to as submarine bombs, torpedoes, coffers, 
or carcasses. These were to be of two main types: one, lighter 
than water, to be anchored beneath the surface in enemy 
harbors and to  explode on contact; the other, slightly heavier 
than water and buoyed by a cork float, was to be attached by 
a line to the anchor cabIe of an enemy ship. The tide or cur- 
rent would then carry the mine under the ship's bottom, 
where a clock-work mechanism, previously set, would cause 
the explosion. 
These ingenious plans did not escape the adverse criticism 
of some who Iearned of them. Some, who were afraid that 
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Fulton really had something, said that  Britain should not 
sponsor inventions which might recoil upon her, and those 
who had no faith said the whole thing was foolishness. No 
one apparently said anything about the ethics of the new 
method. Fulton repeatedly claimed that his system would 
mean the obsolescence of all fleets as they were then con- 
stituted. When old Earl St. Vincent, the greatest adminis- 
trative admiral of his day, heard what was going forward "he 
reflected for some time and then said Pitt was the greatest 
fool that ever existed, to  encourage a mode of war which 
they who commanded the seas did not want: and which, if 
successful, would deprive them of it." 
The statement sometimes made that the British were more 
interested in getting Fulton away from the French than in 
backing his inventions is without foundation, although Ful- 
ton sometimes complained of financial undernourishment. 
Actually there were at  least seven attempts made in 1804 and 
1805 to  use the new weapons, some on a large scale, some on 
individual forays against a single ship. The large-scale attacks 
were invariably carried out in such a way that all advantage 
of surprise was lost, and, also invariably, they were carried 
out with great dash and daring. The net result was niI, ex- 
cept to teach the French to  keep their eyes open. 
The original mines were copper spheres, but in the second 
large attack a new type, called the coffer, was used. This was 
a great watertight box, 21 feet long, filled with 40 barrels of 
gunpowder, and weighted so that i t  floated barely awash. To  
get them in, catamarans were used; copied from native craft 
in Indian waters, these were simply two large 9 by 9 timbers, 
about 10 feet long, held parallel by struts. A sailor, wearing 
a black jersey and with his face covered by a black mask of 
the sort now favored by professional wrestlers, sat half im- 
mersed amidships and sculled the thing along. It was sup- 
30 Public Lectures 
posed to be practically invisible, and the job of the operator 
was that already indicated: t o  attach his coffer, pull out a 
pin actuating the clock-work detonator, paddle away and let 
the tide do the rest. Despite the improbable sound of all this, 
such an attack was actually carried out on one occasion, There 
were terrific explosions, but no damage was done and the 
Frenchmen were left with some interesting trophies. Appar- 
ently Fulton had forgotten that a small explosion under wa- 
ter would be more effective than a big one on the surface. 
Something was always getting fouled up. On two occasions 
when boats' crews dropped pairs of torpedoes perfectly, 
again with no effective result, Fulton explained that the 
French ships "owed their safety to  the trifling circumstance 
of the torpedoes not being properly balanced when in water, 
and the coupling lines not being tied t o  a bridle, so as t o  
make the torpedoes sheer under the bottoms of the brigs." 
But trifling circumstances seemed more than trifling to  the 
men who had risked their lives. 
Once the attacks started, there could be no more secrecy 
about the general features of the plan, and there was further 
talk about foolish novelties. Mr. William Cobbett, who was 
against the administration and a number of other things as 
well, put a poem in his Political Register. The people men- 
tioned in it, aside from that familiar nautical character, Jack 
Tar  or Tarpaulin, are civilian members of the Cabinet in 
1804, notably the Scotsman Henry Dundas, who was Vis- 
count Melville and for a short time First Lord of the Admi- 
ralty; the following are a few stanzas: 
Dundas is gone to  Boulogne; 
He has a pawky plan 
T o  burn the French flotiIla 
'Tis called Catamaran. 
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'Like ladies in romances 
Their knights' exploits t o  spy 
Aloft in Walmer Castle 
Stand Pitt  and Harrowby. 
Dundas our tars haranguing 
Now shows his new-made wares. 
As at  some peddler prating, 
Jack turns his head and swears. 
Your project new? Jack utters; 
Avast; 'Tis very stale; 
'Tis catching birds, landlubbers, 
By salt upon the tail! 
Pit t  and the others are excitedly watching the fireworks: 
There in the blaze go fifty! 
And there go fifty more! 
A hundred in disorder 
There run upon the shore! 
The light of dawn, however, reveals that  "the French are 
laying, just where before they lay." And, in conclusion: 
May Pitt from Colonelling 
Retire upon half pay 
And Admiral Lord Melville 
The yellow flag display! 
(The yellow flag carried none of its modern connotations; i t  was simply 
a figurative way of indicating retirement.) 
I n  truth there were faults on all sides, and in 1806, after 
an acrimonious dispute about money, Fulton departed for 
the United States. He  had what he most wanted, an export 
license for a Wat t  and Bolton engine, an engine which in the 
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next year drove the famous North River Steamboat, usually, 
but less accurately, called the Clermont. 
Fulton was a man of enormous energy and capacity, and 
naturally he tried to  interest his own government in the ideas 
which, he felt, had received less than their due in England. 
He had prophesied that  Britain would see the day when the 
Thames mouth would be blocked with mines, and the Chan- 
nel, too, with a barrage of mines from shore t o  shore. He was 
too early by a hundred years or so, but this does not detract 
from his abilities. He had also pointed out t o  the British 
government "the bad policy of forcing me into a position 
where I must apply them (my engines) to  the totaI subjuga- 
tion of this country." This kind of utterance had not won him 
many friends. Now the state of tension between Britain and 
the United States gave him the chance to  show what he 
could do. 
He  was willing enough, but the United States government 
adopted essentially the same attitude as that of His Britan- 
nic Majesty. Jefferson, no mean inventor in his own right, 
was interested, and eventually Fulton got $500 and the hulk 
of an old ship to  practise on. Spectators were invited, and on 
the third trial the hulk was blown up, but no one was much 
impressed. Washington Irving paid his respects t o  the new 
warfare in the thirteenth issue of Salmagundi: 
[It is] an excellent plan of defense. . . no need of batteries, 
forts, frigates and gunboats: observe, sir, all that's necessary 
is that the ship must come to anchor in a convenient place- 
watch must be asleep, or so complacent as not t o  disturb the 
boats paddling around them-fair wind and no tide-no moon- 
light-machines well directed-mustn't flash in the pan- 
bang's the word, and the vessel's blown up in a moment! 
Fulton was busy with steamboats, but he stopped long 
enough in 1810 to  present each member of Congress with a 
pamphIet entitled "Torpedo War & Submarine Explosions." 
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But it was the same old story-no real interest, no money, 
many scoffers, and several determined enemies of the inven- 
tion. Nevertheless, Fulton inspired many followers, and the 
War of 1812 abounds in minor episodes of men with more 
daring than skill bobbing about in home-made submersibles 
and other craft, trying to blow uptheBritish blockaders. Since 
a t  the moment they had none of these devices themselves, 
the British naturally denounced the whole thing as piracy. 
Fulton's last invention was the first steam warship ever to 
get under weigh, a strange vessel with thick sides and pad- 
dles well protected between a double hull, an anticipation of 
the iron-clad. Besides other weapons, she carried a huge hose 
worked by a steam pump, designed to wash the enemy's 
sailors off his decks and dampen his guns. Rumor crossed 
the Atlantic more quickly than this Demologos, or Peoples' 
Yoice, as she was called, could be built; it was reliably re- 
ported that her sides were 1 3  feet thick, with other dimen- 
sions beyond anything ever known (actually she was rather 
small); that she could discharge IOO gallons of boiling water 
per minute to repel boarders and that she was fitted with a 
mechanism to brandish 300 cutlasses over the side a t  15- 
second intervals. On hearing all this the British staged a 
commando raid to  seize Fulton in his bed, but he was luckily 
delayed that night and was not at  home. Unfortunately for 
the romance of invention, the war ended before the new mon- 
ster of the deep was fitted with her engines. She later moved, 
but not in anger, and Fulton, who died just after the peace 
treaty was signed, was not there to see her. But he died suc- 
cessful, for he took the steamship out of the curiosity class. 
The last British attempt, late in November, 1805, to use 
Fulton's mine-torpedoes was a full-dress affair. It failed be- 
cause of bad weather, and the season was too far advanced 
for a furthe'r effort, but i t  marked also the first use in modern 
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warfare of another very secret weapon, the rocket. The year 
before, a certain William Congreve (not the playwright), 
taking an idea from native warfare in India, had received 
government encouragement to  carry out some experiments. 
He was the son of the Comptroller of the Royal Ordnance 
Laboratory a t  Woolwich, and no doubt this helped him to  get 
a hearing; he soon had as his backers the Prime Minister, 
William Pitt, and another redoubtable amateur warrior, Lord 
Castlereagh, the Secretary of State for War. 
Mr. Congreve's weapon was a gigantic skyrocket with a 
stick 25 feet long, filled with a highly combustible material 
which is, so far as I know, still secret. A meeting of the brain- 
trust for the new warfare is thus reported by one veteran ad- 
miral to  another, Lord Keith to Lord Barham (October 12, 
1805). Lord Keith was in command of the Channel forces 
and was, understandably, feeling a little hurt: "My Lord-I 
returned from Walmer this morning, where I met Lord Cas- 
tlereagh, Mr. Pitt, Sir Sidney Smith, Mr. Francis, and Mr. 
Congreve. The plans seem determined upon, and I was only 
asked about the means of putting them into execution. Sir 
Sidney seemed to have only one wish, which is to get all the 
force in this coast put under his direction, to create an eclat 
in the papers; Mr. Francis is full of coffers, carcasses, and 
submarine boats, which will not answer here; and Mr. Con- 
greve, who is ingenious, is wholly wrapt up in rockets from 
which I expect little success, for Mr. Congreve has no idea 
of the means of applying them professionalIy." 
Sir Sidney Smith, whose career reads like a particularly ex- 
citing novel about Mr. Forester's hero Captain Hornblower, 
was the officer in immediate charge of the project. He was 
far too brilliant a man to be left out of things and far too sure 
of himself t o  have many well-wishers. The new warfare was 
made to order for him. 
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Even while Sir Sidney's forces were moving out for the big 
attempt, on the night of November 17, Lord Barham, eighty- 
year-old First Lord of the Admiralty and still a doughty 
fighter, was writing t o  give Mr. Pitt the facts of naval war- 
fare as he saw them. He pointed out that ships were escaping 
from Dutch harbors, with more certain to  follow, and all be- 
cause a third of the Channel forces have been waiting on Sir 
Sidney Smith. "Much as I condemn this romantic kind of 
warfare," he said, "I have suppressed my sentiments be- 
cause you and Lord Castlereagh take so great a share in it"; 
but now that  he sees the enemy enjoying himself, he can 
keep silent no longer. 
Sir Sidney reported from mid-channel that Congreve was 
having trouble, in a heavy sea, with his rocket frames and 
with his willing but green assistants; "we can but try," he 
concluded. They did try, but the waves were too high for the 
attack to  be pressed home; the coffer-mines floated in all 
directions; the rockets flared without taking off or perversely 
headed back toward England. It was a fiasco, and Lord Keith 
besought Lord Barham to  call off the amateurs. “interpose 
your professional experience with the protectors of these 
projects," he wrote, "and they will abandon them; for the 
authors of them never will, so long as they are maintained 
luxuriously a t  the public expense." 
Nevertheless Mr. Pitt still believed in the rocket, and the 
next year, 1806, Congreve came up with an improved ver- 
sion. The stick was reduced t o  15 feet; the body was of iron 
instead of paper; the range was upwards of 3000 yards; some 
rockets were incendiaries only, while others were headed 
with 6- and rz-pound spherical shells filled with musket balls 
"to burst in the air on Colonel Shrapnel's principle." 
Congreve was obviously nervous about his brain-child and 
bombarded the new First Lord, Thomas Grenville, with let- 
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ters about its advantages. Since the rocket had no recoil, 
any vessel was capable of launching it; a smaIl craft might 
thus have great firepower, and the massing of such ships for 
one almost simultaneous discharge wouId achieve surprise 
and necessarily produce a cumulative effect, with greater 
safety for the users. I n  every way i t  compared favorably with 
its rival, the mortar shelI; it was cheaper per unit, and far 
cheaper if all the mountings were taken into account. It had 
been objected that the enemy would simply extinguish or 
drag away the incendiary rockets, but to  discourage such a 
practise an explosive charge had been included in a certain 
number of them. 
On October 9, 1806, Commodore Owen gave Boulogne a 
rocket treatment; Congreve reported that  400 rockets had 
been discharged in half an hour and great damage inflicted, 
particularly on that part of the town where the naval store- 
houses were. This estimate was reduced by the Commodore 
to  read zoo rockets, most of which were caught in a cross 
wind and carried off line; the town and shipping still seemed 
to  be in good condition. As Owen reported: "I must add I 
felt extreme vexation that Mr. Congreve suffered himself t o  
be carried away by his sanguine feelings. . . . It is of this 
sanguine disposition I have always had more fear than I had 
of danger in the execution of the project." 
A few months later a ship full of rocket equipment was 
sent out t o  Admiral Collingwood off Cadiz, for use in Admiral 
Duckworth's expedition against Constantinople. Colfing- 
wood did not refer t o  the invention as "Mr. Congreve's 
squibs,'' as some had done, but when he had looked them 
over he felt grave doubts about their accuracy, although he 
hopefully reported "if the ships lie very dose at  Constanti- 
nople, chance may supply the place of accuracy." This was 
something of a contradiction t o  the instructions sent by 
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Grenville, who had said: "I trust you will feel with me the 
propriety of restraining the use of these destructive machines 
entirely against armed shipping or military or naval prepara- 
tions, because the mere burning of a town or village is a 
species of warfare which is not worthy of, or fit for, the spirit 
of our service." The rockets were too late for Constantinople, 
but the spirit of the service was not so squeamish later in the 
year a t  Copenhagen, where the city was certainly burnt, 
with the rocket men claiming the largest share of the credit. 
Congreve adapted the rocket for use on land, and the weap- 
on was later sent to  the Duke of Wellington in Spain. The 
Duke, notoriously conservative in all matters of ordnance 
and, indeed, in all matters, said "I don't want t o  set fire to  
any town, and I don't know any other use of rockets." Never- 
theless, rockets were used at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813, 
where they had at  least a considerable moral effect, and at 
Bayonne in February, 1814, they were credited with breaking 
up a French counter-attack. Later in the same year, as every- 
one knows, the rockets' red glare lighted up the Stars and 
Stripes over Fort McHenry. 
What the Iron Duke really liked was the bombs bursting 
in air on Colonel Shrapnel's principIe. This projectile-not, 
of course, a true flat-trajectory shell-was first adopted by 
the British army in 1803 and later used with great effect in 
the Spanish Peninsular campaign. Apparently it had an ad- 
justable fuse which was ignited by the firing of the gun. 
Wellington considered i t  so important to  keep this weapon 
secret that he asked that all honors and recognition be with- 
held from its inventor until the end of the war. He wrote, 
however, many personal letters of commendation, and one 
of his staff officers added that the increased effectiveness of 
the artillery had been cccomplimented both by the French 
and by  our own general officers, in a way highly flattering 
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to  us." Shrapnel shells figured a t  the Battle of Waterloo and 
perhaps decisively, for General Wood, who commanded the 
British artillery, wrote to  Shrapnel that his invention had 
been instrumental in regaining the position of La Haye Sainte, 
which was the key position of the whole battle. And the 
ubiquitous Sir Sidney Smith, finding in 1813 that he could 
not get enough shrapnel shells through official channels, or- 
dered some at  his own expense from the Carron factory. 
Looking over the field, Napoleon is perhaps more to  be 
criticized than the British for failing to  go all out for secret 
weapons, since by such means the great naval disparity 
might have been equalized. But the truth is that the time had 
not quite come. What we have here is the beginning of the 
mechanical part of the industrial revolution as appIied to  
warfare. The day was dawning for the great applied inven- 
tions-steam, armor, rifled ordnance, shell, real submarines 
and real torpedoes, but even the stimulus of a twenty years' 
war, though it could force the seed, could not bring about any 
real growth. 
Great Britain could have won the war without secret weap- 
ons-indeed, she did win the war without secret weapons. 
No one can maintain that torpedo-mines or rockets or shrap- 
nel in themselves turned the tide. Britain won because she 
never imagined that  she could be defeated and because she 
never gave up trying. Further, she never gave up thinking. 
Besides the military genius of the enemy, there were mistakes 
and stupidity fit to  take the heart out of the country, but 
even these obstacles were surmounted. 
It is perhaps along such a line that the significance of the 
secret weapons lies. It is true that they were indecisive, so far 
as the over-all course of the war was concerned, and that they 
were generally ill-supported-no billion dollars was expended 
on any one of them. They were usually employed in scanty 
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numbers, without the benefit of surprise, and often under 
adverse conditions. Their proponents, though in high places, 
were amateurs and easy marks for the critics. The parallel 
comes to  mind of Winston Churchill and his tanks, a tremen- 
dous weapon put through in the face of a11 sorts of opposition 
and then employed in small numbers, in a local operation, 
in the late autumn of 1916, when success was improbable 
and exploitation impossible. 
In  the old days professional men mistrusted the mad 
geniuses, sometimes leaving off the geniuses, and the civilians 
who backed them. Nowadays this has all been changed and 
nothing shows more clearly the progress of applied science 
in the last hundred years than the respect shown to OSRD, 
NDRC, and other mysterious sources of national power. 
But however mistrusted and misemployed, the work of the 
pioneer inventors in Napoleonic days shows an intelligent 
and aggressive spirit a t  work. It was vitally necessary for 
Britain to  regain the offensive-not merely t o  stave off de- 
feat each year. William Pitt tried hard; he backed the secret 
weapons; and it was not his fault that the coalition of 1806 
did not bring Napoleon down. A lesser man than Napoleon 
would have fallen, but instead there was the Battle of Auster- 
litz. Even with danger threatening a t  home, forces despatched 
by Pitt occupied South Italy and Sicily, and the Cape of 
Good Hope: thus the outer lines were held and communica- 
tions secured. Pitt died of disappointment and cirrhosis of 
the liver in 1807, but there were others to  carry on. 
At first they failed, and kept on failing. Sir John Duckworth 
was sent to  bring the Turks into line in 1807, an expedition 
not at all unlike the famous Dardanelles campaign of 1915. 
Both were good ideas, t o  begin with; both carried the same 
potential benefits of taking Turkey out of the enemy camp 
and bolstering the Russians; both failed because the com- 
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mander on the spot lacked the determination to  see the thing 
through. 
A big combined operation was mounted in 1809 to  cap- 
ture the vital port of Antwerp. It had Sir Richard Strachan 
as its admiral and the Earl of Chatham, Pitt's elder brother, 
as its general. It got ashore but never got near Antwerp. It 
is a long and a sad story but it may be summarized in a bit of 
doggerel much quoted in London after the return of the 
Great Chatham, with his sabre drawn, 
Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan; 
Sir Richard, longing to  be at  'em, 
Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham. 
But the search for the offensive had already given Welling- 
ton his beach-head in Portugal. He was aImost pushed into 
the sea, but he had the famous defenses of Torres Vedras 
ready-in themselves a secret of sorts, for his adversary was 
unpleasantly surprised when he saw them. This time there 
was no fiasco. When Wellington counter-attacked he still had 
a long road to  travel, but the defensive part of the war was 
definitely past. 
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